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A. International Jus Cogens and Domestic Analogies 
1. In 1969, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) consecrated the 
international jus cogens in its Art. 53 and 64. Yet half a century later, the definition, 
foundations and functions of this concept are still open to debate. International jus cogens’ 
core ideas are reminiscent of well-established domestic concepts of imperative law (jus 
publicum) and ordre public (public policy) (Alexidze 233, Kolb (2015) 1). Like the 
imperative rules of domestic legal orders, international jus cogens cannot be derogated from. 
And like public order, it designates a special set of norms protecting the basic values of the 
international community (comp. Hoffmeister & Kleinlein and Gebauer). However, jus cogens 
differs significantly from its domestic cognates. It differs from jus publicum on more than one 
account. In a vertical legal order like the national one, the jus publicum is the product of the 
will of a superior authority. There is nothing alike in the international legal system, where 
States are equal and no superior authority can assert jurisdiction over them. Moreover, in 
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domestic law, the liberty of contract is subject to public law. By contrast, on the international 
level, the principle of sovereign liberty is an essential foundation of treaty law, operating in 
favour of States’ freedom to create by consent whatever obligations they deep appropriate. 
International jus cogens also differs significantly from the domestic ordre public, which 
deploys its effects in private international law, as a limit to the application of foreign law or to 
the recognition of foreign judicial decisions. International jus cogens is essentially a public 
law concept, instituting a hierarchy of norms in an otherwise horizontal legal system, erecting 
a limit to the autonomy of consent, laying the ground for an aggravated regime of 
responsibility for internationally wrongful acts and so on. Ordre public’s and jus cogens’ 
functions are thus fundamentally different.  
 
2. On the international plane, these domestic analogies served as a springboard to 
emancipate international jus cogens from its natural law origins, with an aim to bringing it 
within the realm of positive law (Tladi, 1st Report, paras 18-27; Gomez Robledo 17-36). 
However, this emancipation did not lead to the recognition of jus cogens as a new formal 
source of international law, alongside treaties, custom, general principles of law and 
resolutions of international organizations. On the international legal plane, the nature of jus 
cogens remains therefore debated: for some, the concept covers a set of substantial rules 
reflecting basic values (Tladi, 1st Report, paras 18-27 with references) or merely “a legal 
technique which attaches to a series of norms to confer on them a particular resistance to 
derogation” (Kolb (2013) 3). These fluctuating conceptions make difficult to ascertain the 
place of international jus cogens in the national legal orders. 
 
B. Recognition of international jus cogens in national law 
 
1. Importance of domestic jurisprudence in the absence of express constitutional recognition 
3. Being a new and uncertain concept of international law, jus cogens is generally not 
expressly mentioned in national constitutions. The only notable exception comes from the 
1999 Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation (Switzerland), whose Art. 139-3, 193-4 
and 194-2 refer to “mandatory provisions of international law” (“les règles impératives du 
droit international”; “die zwingenden Bestimmungen des Völkerrechts”). The absence of 
express recognition has not been an obstacle to its adoption by domestic judges elsewhere. 
Some scarce references appear in in the 1970-1990 in domestic case-law (in particular from 
the United States), but the years 2000 mark a turn, due to important developments in 
international criminal law (in 1998, the adoption of the Rome Statute of the ICC and a 
specific recognition of the prohibition of torture as a jus cogens rule by the ICTY in 
Furundžija). At present, there are several hundred domestic decisions from diverse legal 
traditions, referring to jus cogens or to peremptory rules of international law. This contrasts 
with the still prudent use of jus cogens in international jurisprudence. In States like France, 
where political authorities still question if not the existence of jus cogens as a concept, at least 
its nature and content, domestic judges make nonetheless reference to it (comp. Conseil 
d’Etat, opinion of 21 Feb. 2003 and Cour de cassation, La Réunion aérienne et autres c. 
Jamahiriya arable libyenne). This emancipation from the position of political authorities 
attests to the universality and general acceptance of this concept. 
 
4. The question then arises what the domestic legal foundations for the recognition and 
application of international jus cogens are. In principle, two parameters are important for 
defining the situation of international norms in the domestic legal orders. First, the monist or 
dualist tradition of a particular legal order determines whether an international norm is 
immediately applicable in the national legal system or whether it needs incorporation by 
domestic legislation. Second, domestic legal systems make a distinction between the formal 
sources of internal law, granting them a different status. Thus, in most of them, custom is of 
immediate application and no incorporation is required (“international law is part of the law 
of the land”). This is not necessarily the case of treaties. The prevailing view among 
internationalists is that jus cogens represents a particular category of custom, characterized by 
the reinforced opinio juris according to which the norm is not only obligatory, but does not 
suffer any derogation. However, for the purposes of domestic application, jus cogens does not 
entirely share the status of custom. A few courts concluded to an automatic incorporation of 
jus cogens applying by analogy the status of international custom. For instance, the Court of 
Appeal for Ontario held that “customary rules of international law are directly incorporated 
into Canadian domestic law unless explicitly ousted by contrary legislation (…). This is even 
more so where the obligation is a peremptory norm of customary international law, or jus 
cogens.” (Bouzari v. Islamic Republic of Iran, para. 65)). Yet, the Court also noted that “a 
peremptory norm of customary international law or rule of jus cogens is a higher form of 
customary law.” (ibid, para. 86). In this respect, the Court dissociated the domestic status of 
jus cogens from the one of customary international law.  
 
5. The reason for such dissociation is that each domestic legal system has its own 
hierarchy of norms, where the place of international law sources is also specified. In most of 
them, international custom rarely prevails over domestic legislation, whereas treaty law often 
enjoys a superior hierarchical status (Shelton (ed) 5-7). If jus cogens enjoyed the status 
recognized to international custom, this would lead to the absurd result that it would become 
inferior to treaties, which would be the very negation of one of the core-element of jus cogens 
– namely its superior legal status. No domestic decision has ever followed this path of 
argumentation. On the contrary, even if some of them held that jus cogens norms are of 
customary origin (Italy, South Africa, United States), the concept was systematically invoked 
to highlight the superior legal status of the international rule at stake, prevailing over other 
international and domestic rules.  
 
6. Among the few courts specifically addressing the question of domestic reception of 
jus cogens, many prefer to refer cumulatively to the constitutional norm of reception of 
general principles of law and to constitutional principles protecting human rights. For 
instance, German Constitutional Court relied cumulatively on Art. 1-2 of the Basic Law 
which recognizes inviolable and inalienable human rights and on Art. 25-1 which provides 
that “The general rules of international law shall be an integral part of federal law”. 
Combining the two, the Court concluded that “the Basic Law also adopts the gradual 
recognition of the existence of mandatory provisions” (East German Expropriation case, para. 
97). Similarly, the Supreme Court of Russia referred cumulatively to Art. 15-4 (“The 
universally-recognized norms of international law and international treaties and agreements of 
the Russian Federation shall be a component part of its legal system”) and to Art. 17-1 and 18 
which recognize “the rights and liberties of man” to conclude that, for the purposes of Russian 
domestic system; “[t]he commonly recognised principles of the international law shall imply 
the basic imperative norms of the international law accepted and recognised by the 
international community of States as a whole, the deviation from which is inadmissible.” (Re 
Khodorkovskiy ; see also On Application of Universally Recognized Principles and Norms of 
International Law and of International Treaties of the Russian Federation by Courts of 
General Jurisdiction). On the overall, national jurisprudence recognizes the concept of jus 
cogens, even in the absence of an express constitutional consecration. At the same time, this 
recognition does not rely exclusively on the traditional forms of the rapports de systèmes, 
which pass through the domestic incorporation of formal sources of international law, but also 
through the assimilation with substantive principles, protected by the constitutions (like the 
protection of basic human rights).  
 
2. Domestic pronouncements on the nature of jus cogens 
 
7. Alongside the national sources of reception, domestic judges may also rely on the 
international foundations of jus cogens. Most of them refer to Art. 53 of the VCLT, but this 
reference is of limited scope and is generally used as an example of the international 
recognition of jus cogens (Yousuf v. Samantar; Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Arg.; Suresh 
v. Canada; Colombia- Decision C-291) alongside other sources (like the ILC Articles on State 
responsibility (Germany: East German Expropriation case; Switzerland: A. v. Office of the 
Attorney general of Switzerland), international jurisprudence (Kaunda and Others v. 
President of the Republic of South Africa; Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Arg.; Colombia- 
Decision C-291) or even the doctrine of the most highly qualified internationalists (A. v. 
Office of the Attorney general of Switzerland). Some judges make further inquiries into the 
binding force of jus cogens and the nature of the concept. Thus, the US Court of Appeal of the 
9th circuit, while accepting that “jus cogens is related to customary international law (the 
direct descendant of the law of nations)”, also insisted on the differences separating them, in 
particular on the fact that State consent cannot be the source of such biding force:  
“Customary international law, like international law defined by treaties and other 
international agreements, rests on the consent of states. (…) [They] create norms 
known as jus dispositivum (…) In contrast, jus cogens ‘embraces customary laws 
considered binding on all nations,’ (…) and ‘is derived from values taken to be 
fundamental by the international community, rather than from the fortuitous or self-
interested choices of nations,’ (…). Whereas customary international law derives 
solely from the consent of states, the fundamental and universal norms constituting jus 
cogens transcend such consent.” (Siderman de Blake v. The Republic of Argentina 
quoting international doctrine). 
 
In the same vein, the Constitutional Court of Colombia considered that State consent could 
not be basis of the binding character of jus cogens, since the purpose of this normative 
category was precisely to transcend it:  
“The norms of jus cogens, or peremptory norms of international law, are rules which, 
by their fundamental nature, hold a special hierarchical status within the body of rules 
of international law, and therefore cannot be ignored by States, thus limiting their 
freedom to conclude treaties and adopt unilateral acts.” (Decision C-291, para. 2.2.1, 
our translation) 
 
8. Instead of rejecting the voluntarist approach, some courts adopt the objectivist view, 
according to which jus cogens reflects fundamental values of the international community. 
The Supreme Court of Argentina stated that the purpose of jus cogens was to “protect States 
from agreements concluded against some values and general interests of the international 
community of States as a whole” (Arancibia Clavel), while the High Court of Kenya referred 
to “the international public order” (Kenya Section of the International Commission of Jurists 
v. Attorney General & Another). In the same vein, the German Constitutional Court held that 
“[t]hese are rules of law which are firmly rooted in the legal conviction of the community of 
states, which are indispensable to the existence of public international law, and the 
compliance with which all members of the community of states may require” (East German 
Expropriation case para. 97, emphasis added). In the absence of consensual criteria for 
determining the fundament values of international community, there is a risk however for 
domestic judges to vehiculate a subjective, unilateral view of when an international law norm 
reaches that status. As the Supreme Court of Canada put it, “[p]eremptory norms develop over 
time and by general consensus of the international community. This is the difficulty in 
interpreting international law; it is often impossible to pinpoint when a norm is generally 
accepted and to identify who makes up the international community” (Suresh v. Canada, para. 
61). To minimize the risk of subjectivity, domestic judges might rely for that purpose on 
international law references, although, as will further be seen, this is not always their 
preferred method. 
 
 
C. Definition of international jus cogens by domestic jurisprudence 
 
1. Criteria and methods for establishing international jus cogens 
 
9. The criteria of jus cogens are much debated on the international plane (Tladi, 2n 
Report). One could hardly expect domestic judges, who come from different legal traditions, 
with different degree of openness to international law, to provide a harmonized jurisprudence 
in this respect. Schematically, one may discern three attitudes when it comes to defining jus 
cogens and identifying the norms enjoying this quality. The argumentative way corresponds 
to the attitude of those domestic judges who draw the general criteria from Art. 53 VCLT, in 
particular on the non-derogable characteristic, then attempt to apply them to particular norms. 
The adoptive method consists in relying on existing case-law (both national and international) 
or even, at times, on the works of international jurists and deduce from these the existence of 
a particular jus cogens norm. Evidence of international practice and of universal recognition 
of the non-derogatory character being difficult to adduce, the demonstrative and adoptive 
methods are generally combined. Finally, there is the assertive way, consisting of proclaiming 
the jus cogens status of some norms, without thorough inquiry into the underlying 
justifications.  
 
10. A decision of the Constitutional Court of Colombia illustrates well the argumentative 
method. After establishing that: “the criteria for the recognition of a rule of international law 
as a rule of jus cogens are strict. According to article 53 of the 1969 Vienna Convention, such 
rules must not only meet the conditions for recognition as rules of international law in the first 
place, but also the additional requirements for recognition as mandatory or peremptory rules 
by the international community as a whole - the so-called ‘double recognition’ process. These 
requirements require consensus of a majority of States, regardless of their cultural and 
ideological differences, on their peremptory nature.” (Decision C-291, para. 2.2.1, our 
translation). The Supreme Court of Canada looked for indicia of non-derogability and 
considered that the non-derogatory status of torture could be deduced from “the fact that such 
a principle is included in numerous multilateral instruments, that it does not form part of any 
known domestic administrative practice, and that it is considered by many academics to be an 
emerging, if not established peremptory norm, suggests that it cannot be easily derogated 
from” (Suresh v. Canada, para. 65). 
 
11. The adoptive method is even more often present. When it comes to ascertaining the 
peremptory character of a particular norm, judges would refer to ICJ judgements (e.g.: the 
dicta in Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co, the Genocide case (Bosnia and Herzegovina 
v. Serbia), but also Corfu Channel and Military and paramilitary activity in Nicaragua and 
against Nicaragua, and of course Jurisdictional immunities). In the conflict opposing the 
Italian courts to the ICJ on the question of State immunity in civil procedures for reparation of 
gross human rights violations, the former considered the ICJ conclusions to be authoritative 
and considered that they could not “interpret the imperative and non-derogable character of 
jus cogens, since the International Court of Justice has exclusive and absolute competence 
over the matter” (Italy, decision no 238/2014). One may find cross-references to decisions 
from other domestic legal orders. The High Court of Kenya referred to the Pinochet decision 
of the British House of Lords and to the Eichmann decision of the Supreme Court of Israel to 
establish universal jurisdiction over international crimes constituting violations of jus cogens 
norms. The United States Court of appeals for the fourth circuit relied on the difference of 
jurisprudence among the Italian and British highest courts to reject the lifting of immunities in 
civil suits (in Yousuf v. Samantar).  
 
12. The assertive method may be illustrated by the Kadi decision of the Court of First 
Instance of the European Union, which drew the quick conclusion that all “fundamental rights 
of human persons [are] covered by jus cogens” (Kadi case, 2005, paras 238, 282). Another 
form of assertive method is the one adopted by the US courts in their landmark cases 
Siderman de Blake and Princz in which, after quoting and briefly analysing Art. 53 VCLT, 
overwhelmingly relied on US sources (either previous decisions or the Restatement (Third) of 
Foreign Relations Law as an authoritative codification of international law) to assert the 
peremptory character of norms like the prohibition of torture, genocide and crimes against 
humanity. Their conclusions are certainly right, but this line of argumentation is inappropriate 
to establish the existence of an international jus cogens norm. 
 
2. Examples of jus cogens norms 
 
13. Domestic courts declare quite often that certain international norms enjoy jus cogens 
status. Whether they are also ready to draw consequences sub judice from these declarations, 
that is another question, which will be addressed in the next section. This being said, they 
rarely concern norms other than universal standards protecting human rights. One example 
may be found in decisions of the Russian Constitutional Court who considered that “[t]he 
universally recognized principles of international law [which, in the Court’s terminology, are 
synonym of jus cogens] include, inter alia, the principle of universal respect for human rights 
and the principle of fulfilment of international obligations in good faith.” (Ruling n° 5 
(2003)). However, it is hard to see how the principle of pacta sunt servanda could qualify as 
jus cogens norm. The Constitutional Court of Russia clearly holds an extensive view of jus 
cogens norms, including among them the principles protecting sovereign equality of States 
(Judgment 12-P/2016). 
 
14. Other courts are more cautious in asserting the jus cogens status of particular norms. 
Relying on pronouncements by international courts, most of them include in this category 
fundamental human rights, in particular those which are declared to be non-derogable even in 
times of emergency or war. Some decisions establish thus a clear correlation between non-
derogable human rights and jus cogens norms:  
“[It] is important to bear in mind that an important indication of the imperative or jus 
cogens nature of a given rule of international law is provided by the fact that the rule 
enshrines human rights guarantees that are not derogable during states of emergency.” 
(Constitutional Court of Colombia, Decision C-291, our translation) 
 
15. Therefore, numerous decisions characterizing the prohibition of torture as jus cogens 
relied on its non-derogable character (eg: Supreme Court of Canada, referring to Art. 2-2, 3 
and 16 of CAT and Art. 33 of the Refugee Convention, held that “the clear prohibitions on 
torture in the CAT [was not] intended to be derogable” (Suresh v. Canada); see also Italy, 
Decision 279/2013; Decision 6 N° 46634 ; US: Siderman de Blake v. The Republic of 
Argentina; Canada: Bouzari v. Islamic Republic of Iran and Suresh v. Canada; United 
Kingdom: Affaire R., ex parte Pinochet v. Bartle and Others). The same can be said about the 
prohibition of genocide, of war crimes and of crimes against humanity (US, Alexis Holyweek 
Sarei et al. v. Rio Tinto PLC and Rio Tinto Limited; Kenya: Section of the International 
Commission of Jurists v. Attorney General). Seeking to dissipate the confusion resulting from 
past cases, the Colombian Constitutional Court noted that only the essential principles of 
humanitarian law are jus cogens and it identified three of them: some “(i) the principle of 
distinction between civilians and combatants, (ii) the principle of precaution, and (iii) the 
principle regarding humane treatment and respect for basic guarantees and safeguards to 
which civilians and persons uninvolved in the conflict are entitled.” (Decision C-291). By 
contrast, derogable human rights such as the right to property (Germany: East German 
Expropriation case) and the right to an effective remedy protected by Art. 6 and 13 ECHR 
and Art. 14 of the 1966 Covenant do not enter the category of norms of jus cogens 
(Switzerland: Al Dulimi, para. 8.4).   
D. Functions of international jus cogens 
 
16. On the international level, the main function of jus cogens identified in Art. 53 and 64 
VCLT is to invalidate treaties violating peremptory norms. But jus cogens now deploys 
effects also in the field of State responsibility, which provides for an aggravated regime of 
responsibility in case of serious breaches of obligations under peremptory norms (Art. 40, 41 
ARSIWA 2001). These functions are however marginal in domestic jurisprudence, whose 
main concern is to draw consequences in the field of judicial guarantees for the protection 
fundamental human rights.  
1. Jus cogens and domestic criminal jurisdiction 
17. As a corollary of the jus cogens character of the prohibition of genocide, of crimes 
against humanity and of torture, some courts asserted a duty to prosecute international crimes 
(see Weatherall, 303-308). Yet, international jus cogens proved not to be a too power tool in 
the fight against impunity. Indeed, when it comes to prosecuting a State’s own nationals, the 
domestic judges will generally rely on criminal law provisions defining those international 
crimes and providing for their regime. When it comes to judging persons who are not a State’s 
nationals and when the crimes had taken place abroad, thus asserting a form of universal 
jurisdiction, specific developments of international criminal law and the adoption of the ICC 
Statute provide a firmer foundation than the uncertain jus cogens. The concept may 
nonetheless remain domestically relevant in the areas not covered by this body of law – either 
for prosecuting crimes which are not embodied in the Rome Statute (France: Jamahiriya 
arabe libyenne, in relation to terrorism). It was equally invoked to extend to corporations the 
principle of universal jurisdiction in civil claims for gross human rights violations under the 
Alien Torts Statute (US, Alexis Holyweek Sarei et al. v. Rio Tinto PLC and Rio Tinto Limited). 
2. Jus cogens and immunities 
 
18. Immunities constitute however an important obstacle when it comes to prosecuting 
foreign officials and providing remedies for gross human rights violations. Unsurprisingly, 
many of the domestic decisions deal with the question of jus cogens as a possible obstacle to 
immunities. The overall picture is however blurred. A distinction should be drawn between 
immunities in criminal proceedings and in civil proceedings. 
19. Immunities in criminal proceedings. There is no unanimous view, even among judges 
from the same legal order, that violations of jus cogens norms limit a State’s official right to 
invoke immunities in limine litis. The US case-law is illustrative of these fluctuations. As 
stated by the US Court of appeal for the 4th circuit, “American courts have generally followed 
the foregoing trend, concluding that jus cogens violations are not legitimate official acts and 
therefore do not merit foreign official immunity but still recognizing that head-of-state 
immunity, based on status, is of an absolute nature and applies even against jus cogens 
claims.” (Yousuf v. Samantar, citing in support Sarei v. Rio Tinto, Siderman de Blake; 
Enahoro v. Abubakar). At the opposite end, other courts of appeal consider that accusations of 
war crimes do not automatically lead to the lifting of immunity (cf. Matar v. Dichter and Devi 
v. Rajapaksa deferring to Executive’s suggestion that head-of-state immunity be allowed for 
individual accused of international crimes; Belhas v. Ya’alon, granting immunities to a retired 
head of Israeli army intelligence). After an in-depth analysis of developments in international 
law (conventions, ILC codification, domestic jurisprudence), the Swiss Federal Criminal 
Court detected a trend in the law of nations in favour of rejecting immunities claims in case of 
violations of jus cogens norms (including for the Heads of State). However, it also 
acknowledged that this evolution has not necessarily crystallized into a customary rule:  
“[I]t is undeniable that there is an explicit trend at the international level to restrict the 
immunity of (former) Heads of State vis-à-vis crimes contrary to rules of jus cogens. 
(…) This trend in international law is also reflected at the national level, where a 
similar evolution to put an end to impunity for the most serious crimes can be 
observed. (…). [Considering the ILC’s work on the immunity of State officials] what 
emerges from the report is the Commission’s caution in carefully addressing the issue 
of immunity in order to achieve an acceptable balance between the need to ensure the 
stability of international relations and the need to avoid impunity of the perpetrators of 
serious crimes under international law. (…)”. (A. (Kahled Nezzar). v. Office of the 
Attorney general of Switzerland – a case for torture brought against the former defence 
minister of Algeria; the Court finally rejected the claim to immunity on the basis of a 
teleological interpretation of domestic legislation).  
 
20. Immunities in civil proceedings. While some national courts pierced the veil of 
official-acts immunity to hear civil claims against foreign officials alleging jus cogens 
violations, most of the times the jus cogens exception was rejected in the civil context (inter 
alia, UK: Jones v. Saudi Arabia; US: Yousuf v. Samantar; Canada: Bouzari v. Islamic 
Republic of Iran). Similarly, domestic courts also rejected it in civil proceedings against 
foreign States (US: with Siderman de Blake v. The Republic of Argentina (rejecting an 
exception to State immunity for acts of torture); Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany (no 
exception to immunities for forced labour in Nazi camps); Hwang Geum Joo et al. v. Japan 
(holding Japan’s immunities in the case of ‘comfort women’); Germany: Distomo Case. Only 
the Italian (in Ferrini v. Germany) and the Greek courts (in the Distomo Massacre case) held 
an opposite position, which the ICJ ultimately declared to be in violation of international law 
(Jurisdictional immunities case).  
 
21. On the overall, claims of violations of jus cogens are not sufficient to create a judicial 
remedy or right of action, unless some other rule of domestic or international law drew 
particular consequences from it. While it is certain that the fundamental values protected by 
jus cogens informed developments in the field of procedural law, the judicial guarantees for 
protecting these values still need to be established by specific rules. Neither the domestic 
judge or the international judge for that purpose could fill in the legal lacunae, particularly 
when there appears to be no international consensus on this point. 
 3. Invalidating effect of international jus cogens 
 
22. As stated in Art. 53 and 64 VCLT, the main function of jus cogens in international law 
is to invalidate international acts incompatible with it. There is virtually no domestic case 
where the invalidity of a treaty was sought on this basis. Concerning acts of international 
organizations, the Court of First Instance of the European Union boldly held that it was 
“empowered to check, indirectly, the lawfulness of the resolutions of the Security Council 
(…) with regard to jus cogens, understood as a body of higher rules of public international 
law binding on all subjects of international law, including the bodies of the United Nations, 
and from which no derogation is possible.” Its position was widely criticized and the ECJ 
annulled it, on ground that it is not for the Community judicature to review the lawfulness of 
resolutions adopted by an international body, even if that review were to be limited to 
examination of the compatibility of that instrument with jus cogens (ECJ, Kadi et al. v. 
Council of the European Union, §§ 281-286).  
 
23. Equally unconvincing is the opinion of the Constitutional Court of Russia, which after 
defining the principles protecting sovereign equality of States as being jus cogens norms, it 
used them to invalidate in the domestic legal order the domestic implementation of judgments 
of the ECHR:  
“If the European Court of Human Rights (…) gives to a notion used in the Convention 
a meaning other than the ordinary one or carries out interpretation contrary to the 
object and purpose of the Convention, the state, in respect of which the judgment has 
been passed on this case, has the right to refuse to execute it as it goes beyond the 
obligations, voluntarily taken by this state upon itself when ratifying the Convention. 
(…) [This interpretation] was carried out in violation of the general rule of 
interpretation of treaties, the meaning of this provision will diverge from imperative 
norms of customary international law (jus cogens), to which without doubts the 
principle of sovereign equality and respect for rights inherent in sovereignty and the 
principle of non-interference with internal affairs of states belong.” (Opinion no. 
832/2015) 
 
24. On the overall, domestic judges prove open to the use of international jus cogens. Yet, 
the uncertainties that surround it in international law (as to the nature, definition and above all 
functions) are also present in domestic jurisprudence. Despite these shifting grounds, there is 
no doubt that, through these massive references and cross-reference, domestic jurisprudence 
takes part to the development of international jus cogens. The best example of an international 
effect of domestic jurisprudence comes from the fact that the ILC itself, in its work on jus 
cogens, relies extensively upon domestic decisions.  
(July 2018) 
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